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Vaccine Licensure in the Public Interest: Lessons from 
the Development of the U.S. Army Zika Vaccine 
Ana Santos Rutschman 
abstract.  Vaccines developed by the public sector are key to preventing future outbreaks of 
infectious diseases. However, the licensure of these vaccines to private-sector companies under 
terms that do not ensure both their availability and affordability compromises their develop-
ment. This Essay analyzes the recent attempted licensing deal for a Zika vaccine between the U.S. 
Army and Sanofi, a French pharmaceutical company. The proposed grant of an exclusive license 
to Sanofi triggered widespread concern because none of its substantive terms were disclosed. 
While § 209 of the Patent Act imposes limitations on exclusive licensure, the Army released no 
information supporting its finding that exclusivity would serve the public interest with respect to 
the Zika vaccine. This proposed deal reflects the broader licensing opacity in the current regime, 
which undermines § 209’s safeguards. The Essay proposes changes to the Patent Act to increase 
transparency and accountability in the licensing process, which would ultimately result in more 
affordable vaccines for outbreak diseases like Zika. 
introduction 
In the two years since the Zika epidemic began sweeping the Americas, 
Zika vaccine development has made significant strides.1 While there is still no 
commercially available Zika vaccine, several candidates have emerged as lead-
ing contenders, yielding promising results in clinical trials.2 The vaccine devel-
oped by the U.S. Army was one such candidate, and it was widely considered 
 
1. See, e.g., Stephen J. Thomas, Zika Virus Vaccines—A Full Field and Looking for the Closers, 376 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1883 (2017). 
2. Id. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3104335 
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for a time the leading candidate in the field.3 In December 2016, the Army an-
nounced its intention to license the vaccine for private sector manufacturing,4 
further cementing the status of this federally funded vaccine as the most likely 
candidate to enter the market ahead of any competitors. Several months later, 
however, the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority 
(BARDA), an office in the Department of Health and Human Services, ended 
all contracts for Zika vaccine research and development (R&D).5 Shortly there-
a�er, Sanofi, a French pharmaceutical company working with the Army on 
Zika R&D announced that it would cease all work on the vaccine.6 
Zika vaccine R&D stopped less than a year a�er the declaration of the end 
of the Zika outbreak by the World Health Organization (WHO).7 Since then, 
scientific evidence has confirmed a connection between the Zika virus and se-
vere congenital and neurological problems.8 Future outbreaks are expected to 
increasingly burden women of childbearing age, in line with the outbreaks of 
2015 and 2016. Moreover, the virus is still not fully understood, with recent re-
search positing that Zika R&D might be of use in the study and treatment of 
certain types of cancer.9 Dwindling federal support for Zika R&D thus comes at 
a time in which the scientific understanding of Zika is largely incomplete. At 
the same time, the lack of vaccines leaves our health system ill-prepared to deal 
with future flare-ups of the Zika virus. 
 
3. Jennifer Abbasi, First Inactivated Zika Vaccine Trial, 316 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2588 (2016). 
4. U.S. Army Medical Research and Material Command, Intent to Grant an Exclusive License 
of U.S. Government-owned Patents, 81 Fed. Reg 89087 (Dec. 9, 2016), http://www.gpo
.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-12-09/pdf/2016-29514.pdf [http://perma.cc/7HHX-YSJ5]. 
5. See Peter Lo�us, Sanofi Stops Work on Two Zika Vaccines, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 6, 2017), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sanofi-stops-work-on-two-zika-vaccines-1504734084 [http://
perma.cc/2C4J-V26N]. This is not the first time BARDA has discontinued vaccine R&D 
contracts. The same also happened with the anthrax vaccine in 2014. See BioPrepWatch, 
BARDA to Descope PharmAthene SparVax Contract (Apr. 9, 2014), http://bioprepwatch.com
/stories/510512242-barda-to-descope-pharmathene-sparvax-contract [http://perma.cc
/FY7U-ZUHD]. 
6. Press Release, Sanofi Pasteur, Sanofi Statement on Zika Vaccine License (Sept. 1, 2017), 
http://www.news.sanofi.us/Sanofi-Statement-on-Zika-Vaccine-License [http://perma.cc
/8N3Y-8FCY]. 
7. See Debra Goldschmidt, WHO Ends Zika Public Health Emergency, CNN (Nov. 18, 2016), 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/18/health/who-ends-zika-public-health-emergency/index
.html [http://perma.cc/BP3J-CSQ4]. 
8. See Zika Virus, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.who.int/mediacentre
/factsheets/zika/en [http://perma.cc/DHU9-D55R]. 
9. Maria Cohut, Brain Cancer Could Be Treated with Zika Virus, MED. NEWS TODAY (Sept. 5, 
2017), http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/319272.php [http://perma.cc/4K3G 
-AKZA]. 
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Problems surrounding the development of Zika vaccines extend well be-
yond the realm of funding limitations. A closer look at the licensing process 
surrounding the Army’s vaccine candidate reveals a deeper strain of legal and 
policy issues that would have affected the eventual availability and affordability 
of Zika vaccines: in late 2016, the Army made the decision to license its vaccine 
on an exclusive basis.10 Sanofi was chosen as the sole developer and manufac-
turer of the vaccine.11 Under § 209 of the Patent Act, federally funded inven-
tions must be licensed on a nonexclusive basis, absent compelling reasons to 
proceed otherwise.12 In addition to granting a private-sector company an ex-
clusive license, the Army failed to provide any reasons for this decision, thereby 
undermining § 209 safeguards.13 The result is that without robust competi-
tion, the exclusive licensee (in this case, Sanofi) will likely have fewer long-
term incentives to innovate, as well as greater incentives to charge higher prices 
for the vaccine. 
The exclusive licensing regime has also hindered short-term innovation. 
Now that the Army’s only private-sector partner in this venture has pulled out 
due to funding cuts, R&D on the most promising Zika vaccine candidate has 
stopped. Had the Army chosen to work with multiple licensees, one of them 
could have carried on the work, even if more slowly.14 
This Essay explores the problems surrounding the licensure of the Army’s 
Zika vaccine, highlighting their salience in a world of declining funding for 
government-supported research.15 At a broader level, the Army case study 
sheds new light on problems that are likely to repeat themselves in the near fu-
ture. Vaccines for imminent outbreaks of pathogens are currently in the early 
stages of R&D, and outbreaks of unknown pathogens will require the devel-
 
10. See U.S. Army Medical Research and Material Command, supra note 4. 
11. Id. See also Timeline of U.S. Army & Sanofi Zika Vaccine Collaboration, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY 
INT’L, http://keionline.org/zika-timeline [http://perma.cc/8AJ2-AXY2]. 
12. 35 U.S.C. § 209(a) (2012) (allowing the grant of an exclusive or partially exclusive license 
only when it is a “reasonable and necessary incentive” to either “call forth the investment 
capital and expenditures needed to bring the invention to practical application” or “other-
wise promote the invention’s utilization by the public”). 
13. U.S. Army Medical Research and Material Command, supra note 4. 
14. A considerable amount of innovation today takes place outside big pharmaceutical compa-
nies, within small or specialized startup companies. See, e.g., Jennifer Alsever, Big Pharma 
Innovation in Small Places, FORTUNE (May 13, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/05/13/big 
-pharma-biotech-startups [http://perma.cc/UV6K-P9LZ]. 
15. See, e.g., Jeffrey Mervis, Data Check: U.S. Government Share of Basic Research Funding Falls 
Below 50%, SCI. (Mar. 9, 2017), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/03/data-check-us 
-government-share-basic-research-funding-falls-below-50 [http://perma.cc/9EJE-QMTJ]. 
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opment of new vaccines.16 Against this backdrop, the Essay argues that the li-
censing framework presently applicable to federally funded innovation is inad-
equate. The current regime opens the door to licensing practices that harm the 
public interest, particularly in fields like vaccine R&D. 
Part I traces the development of the Army’s Zika vaccine from early to mid-
2016, with a focus on the proposed exclusive licensing agreement that would 
have transferred rights over the vaccine to Sanofi. It situates this transfer with-
in the context of the Patent Act, which establishes a strong preference for non-
exclusivity when publicly funded research is transferred into the private sector. 
The Essay then argues that exclusive licensing deals like the one between the 
Army and Sanofi are detrimental to the public interest. Part II proposes two so-
lutions. The first is a mechanism to ensure greater transparency (and corre-
sponding accountability) when the government grants exclusive licenses in any 
domain: a set of small changes to the Patent Act requiring the disclosure of key 
terms in exclusive licenses. The second is narrowly designed to address specific 
problems in the specific field of vaccines treating or preventing underfunded 
diseases: the creation of a list of diseases for which federally funded vaccines 
would be automatically ineligible for § 209 exclusivity. 
i .  the army’s zika vaccine: development and attempted 
licensure  
A. The Army’s Zika Vaccine 
Operating under the Department of Defense, the Walter Reed Army Insti-
tute of Research (WRAIR) has a long history of generating biomedical tech-
nologies that are used both inside and outside the military. WRAIR’s contribu-
tions have been especially notable in the development of vaccine technology: 
the Army has pioneered vaccines for diseases including hepatitis A and Japa-
nese encephalitis and helped develop vaccines for HIV and malaria.17 
In January 2016, as the Zika outbreak reached its apex, the Army decided to 
start Zika R&D, borrowing technology that it had originally developed for its 
Japanese encephalitis vaccine. The resulting Zika vaccine candidate—known as 
ZPIV (Zika Purified Inactivated Virus)—was developed in record time by any 
 
16. An R&D Blueprint for Action to Prevent Epidemics: Plan of Action, WORLD HEALTH ORG.  
21-22 (May 2016), http://www.who.int/blueprint/about/r_d_blueprint_plan_of_action
.pdf [http://perma.cc/XS9M-66UP]. 
17. Nelson L. Michael, WRAIR’s Contribution to the Vaccine Enterprise, WALTER REED ARMY INST. 
RES. 20 (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/WRAIR.pdf [http://perma
.cc/4U6W-U9DB]. 
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R&D standards.18 In May 2016, the Army filed a patent application covering 
the vaccine,19 and in August 2016, the Army applied for a second patent.20 
With newly developed vaccine technology ready for human subject testing, 
the Army sought a partner to move the vaccine into the next stages of the R&D 
process. This is not an unusual move for government research organizations, 
which use a significant portion of their resources to further R&D on diseases 
that command scarce R&D attention from the private sector. Typically, these 
organizations end up sharing or transferring late-stage R&D duties to one or 
more parties, which may bring in increased technical and manufacturing capac-
ity. In the case of the Zika vaccine, the Army signed a CRADA—a cooperative 
research and development agreement between a federal and non-federal par-
ty21—with the vaccines division of Sanofi, one of the world’s largest pharma-
ceutical companies.22 
Up to this point, the Army had engaged solely in preclinical development of 
the vaccine, with support from the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases (NIAID) and BARDA. Pursuant to the CRADA with Sanofi, the Army 
would share data collected during pre-clinical tests and release biological sam-
ples emerging from studies performed in nonhuman primates.23 Sanofi would 
undertake phase II clinical trials and seek regulatory approval for the vaccine 
from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), as well as the agency’s coun-
terparts outside the United States.24 In order to support phase II clinical trials, 
BARDA granted Sanofi $43.2 million in September 2016,25 and trials began 
two months later.26 
 
18. Annette M. Boyle, Army Research Produces Zika Vaccine Candidate in Record Time,  
U.S. MED. (Aug. 2016), http://www.usmedicine.com/agencies/department-of-defense-dod
/army-research-produces-zika-vaccine-candidate-in-record-time [http://perma.cc/CPZ3 
-J2DU]. 
19. Zika Virus Vaccine and Methods of Production (U.S. Provisional Patent Application 
62/343,315). 
20. Zika Vaccine and Methods of Preparation (U.S. Provisional Patent Application 62/370,260). 
21. See 15 U.S.C § 3710a (2012) (outlining the legal structure of cooperative research and devel-
opment agreements). 
22. This division, known as Sanofi Pasteur, has a record for drug overcharging in the field of 
vaccines. See infra note 44; see also SANOFI PASTEUR, http://www.sanofipasteur.us [http://
perma.cc/6XJU-TMR8]. 
23. Press Release, Sanofi Pasteur, Sanofi Pasteur Signs Research Agreement for Zika Vaccine 
(Jul. 6, 2016), http://www.sanofipasteur.com/en/articles/Sanofi-Pasteur-Signs-Research 
-Agreement-for-Zika-Vaccine.aspx [http://perma.cc/GPA6-K6TC]. 
24. Id. 
25. Press Release, Sanofi Pasteur, BARDA Grants $43.2 Million USD to Sanofi Pasteur for Zika 
(Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.sanofipasteur.com/en/articles/BARDA-Grants-43.2-million 
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In December 2016, the Army published a notice in the Federal Register of 
its intent to license both Zika vaccine patents to Sanofi.27 Apart from an indica-
tion that Sanofi would be the exclusive licensee of the vaccine technology, no 
other information was provided. 
Section 207 of the Patent Act allows federal agencies to “grant nonexclusive, 
exclusive, or partially exclusive licenses under federally owned inventions,”28 on 
either a royalty-bearing or a royalty-free basis, depending on the case.29 Tradi-
tionally, these transfers of rights over patented inventions have been a staple of 
the dynamics of U.S. biomedical innovation. The government o�en jumpstarts 
basic scientific research, before handing over downstream research—the devel-
opment of drugs and vaccines for commercialization—to private-sector compa-
nies.30 The role of the public sector in promoting basic research is especially 
relevant in the case of diseases like Zika, where markets for the resulting vac-
cines are too small to attract private-sector investment,31 at least until a severe 
public health crisis. 
However, the Patent Act also restricts the transfer of government-
developed technologies in order to ensure that downstream development of 
these technologies furthers the public interest, rather than the commercial in-
terests of the licensees. A preference for nonexclusive licenses represents the 
most significant of these restrictions. Although § 207 enables the federal gov-
ernment to grant both exclusive and nonexclusive licenses, § 209 restricts ex-
clusive and partially exclusive licenses to cases in which exclusivity is “a reason-
 
-USD-to-Sanofi-Pasteur-for-Zika.aspx [http://perma.cc/G3KM-2TSW]. The contract itself 
between BARDA and Sanofi is not publicly available, though the contract number, Contract 
HHSO100201-6000039C, was released. Id.  
26. See Press Release, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, Testing of Investiga-
tional Inactivated Zika Vaccine in Humans Begins (Nov. 7, 2016), http://www.niaid
.nih.gov/news-events/testing-investigational-inactivated-zika-vaccine-humans-begins 
[http://perma.cc/C3C2-86FV]. 
27. Intent To Grant an Exclusive License of U.S. Government-Owned Patents, 81 Fed. Reg. 
89,087 (Dec. 9, 2016). 
28. 35 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2) (2012). 
29. Id.; see also id. § 209(a)(1) (outlining when a federal agency may grant an exclusive or par-
tially exclusive license). 
30. See Ashley J. Stevens et al., The Role of Public-Sector Research in the Discovery of Drugs and 
Vaccines, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 535, 540-41 (Feb. 10, 2011) (noting that over the past dec-
ades, the role of the public sector in downstream research has grown more than previously 
thought). 
31. Cf. Patrice Trouiller et al., Drug Development for Neglected Diseases: A Deficient Market and a 
Public-Health Policy Failure, 359 LANCET 2188 (June 22, 2002) (describing the disparity in re-
search and development between more “profitable” diseases and neglected infectious diseas-
es). 
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able and necessary incentive” to bring the innovation to the public.32 Specifical-
ly, an agency granting an exclusive license must also make a finding that 
the public will be served by the granting of the license, as indicated by 
the applicant’s intentions, plans, and ability to bring the invention to 
practical application or otherwise promote the invention’s utilization by 
the public, and that the proposed scope of exclusivity is not greater than 
reasonably necessary to provide the incentive for bringing the invention 
to practical application, as proposed by the applicant, or otherwise to 
promote the invention’s utilization by the public.33 
In addition to incentivizing commercialization and serving the public inter-
est, exclusivity cannot “substantially lessen competition” or violate antitrust 
law.34 Furthermore, in choosing the recipient of an exclusive license, federal 
agencies must give first preference to small business firms that match (or sur-
pass) the capabilities of larger companies.35 
Government-developed vaccine technology may therefore be licensed to a 
single private-sector downstream developer, as the Army intended to do with 
Sanofi, but only as a last-resort measure. In a nutshell, exclusivity must be nec-
essary to incentivize commercialization of the invention by the licensee—and, 
correspondingly, to guarantee public access to the invention. 
In the case of the Zika vaccine, the government has not disclosed evidence 
as to whether exclusivity is necessary or not. In its exclusive license notice, the 
Army only provided the numbers of the provisional patent applications cover-
ing the vaccine, the identity of the intended licensee, and the exclusive nature 
of the license.36 To be sure, the Army notice complied with the disclosure re-
quirements that currently apply to transfers of publicly funded technologies.37 
But precisely because the Army disclosed neither substantive terms of the li-
cense nor any information supporting its finding that exclusivity would serve 
the public interest pursuant to § 209, it is impossible to gauge if exclusivity was 
appropriate in this particular case. 
 
32. 35 U.S.C. § 209(a)(1) (2012). Further conditions imposed on exclusive and partially exclu-
sive licenses are found in § 209(d). 
33. 35 U.S.C. § 209(a)(2) (2012). 
34. 35 U.S.C. § 209(a)(4) (2012). 
35. 35 U.S.C. § 209(c) (2012). 
36. Intent to Grant an Exclusive License of U.S. Government-Owned Patents, 81 Fed. Reg. 
89,087 (Dec. 9, 2016). 
37. 35 U.S.C. § 209(e) (2012). 
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B. Critiquing the Current Notice Regime for Transfers of Publicly Funded 
Technology 
While procedurally speaking, notices disclosing very little information fa-
cially comply with the requirements set forth in the Patent Act, the current no-
tice regime fosters a culture of licensing opacity that undermines the safeguards 
established elsewhere in § 209. This was apparent in the case of the Army’s 
Zika vaccine. Among the requests for more information submitted by several 
institutions, concerns with excessive pricing of the vaccine were paramount.38 
By precluding competition, an exclusive license enables a pharmaceutical com-
pany to charge higher prices for a drug than it otherwise would. An exclusive 
Zika vaccine may therefore reach the market with a price tag that is unafforda-
ble to consumers who need it. For these reasons, it is important that a licensing 
agreement contain pricing provisions, ensuring that a newly developed vaccine 
is affordable to different populations both in the United States and abroad. The 
Army declined to disclose whether the license included any affordable pricing 
provisions: “[t]he U.S. Army lacks the means, expertise, and authority to de-
fine, implement, and enforce ‘affordable prices’ or to set price controls for a po-
tential vaccine that will require great investment and face high risk of failure.”39 
The opacity of the current notice requirements can thus be used to shield 
government organizations from addressing substantive issues that affect the 
availability and affordability of innovative drugs. The expensive price and out-
come uncertainty of drug R&D cannot serve as a basis for an unfiltered grant of 
exclusive rights over the drug—heightened costs and risk are inherent to drug 
development, as well as several other innovation processes. Exclusive licenses 
are only allowed if, a�er an assessment of the actual costs and the risk associat-
ed with the development of a specific drug, an agency concludes that exclusivi-
ty is the appropriate form of economic incentive for commercialization of the 
drug. The Army’s failure to take pricing issues into account when assessing 
whether exclusivity was appropriate for the Zika vaccine is therefore likely to be 
 
38. See, e.g., Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) Comments to the Department 
of Defense Notice of Intent to Grant an Exclusive License of U.S. Government-Owned Patents on a 
Zika Vaccine Candidate, MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES 4 (Jan. 23, 2017), http://www
.msfaccess.org/sites/default/files/MSF_assets/Access/Docs/ACCESS_letter 
_MSFCommentstoFRNoticeREZikaVaxCandidateLicensing_ENG_2016_2.pdf [http://
perma.cc/LCA4-V6Q2]; An Exclusive License to Patents on a New Zika Vaccine to Sanofi Is Con-
trary to the Provisions of 35 U.S.C. 209(a)(1), KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L 2 (Jan. 12, 2017), 
http://www.keionline.org/sites/default/files/Zika-12Jan2016-KEI-AFSCME-PFAM-UAEM
-BAKER-35USC209a1.pdf [http://perma.cc/ML2X-5FYF]. 
39. Letter from Barry M. Datloff, Chief, U.S. Army Med. Research & Materiel Command, to 
James Love, Dir., Knowledge Ecology Int’l 2 (Apr. 21, 2017). 
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a violation of § 209 and its mandate that the exclusive licensee “promote the 
invention’s utilization by the public.”40 
The choice of Sanofi as the exclusive licensee for the Army’s vaccine is even 
more troubling for two reasons. First, the notice of intent to license the vaccine 
on an exclusive basis appeared in the Federal Register three months a�er 
Sanofi received $43.2 million in funding from BARDA. From an economic per-
spective, BARDA’s grant mitigates the overall cost and risk of R&D falling on 
Sanofi. In turn, this weakens the rationale provided by the Army for not engag-
ing in pricing considerations. And second, the grant also reinforces the con-
cerns about further detrimental effects of exclusive licenses, if improperly 
granted: a private-sector company that has already received R&D funding from 
the public sector may charge monopoly-like prices for a drug, thereby taxing 
taxpayers twice.41 
For example, Sanofi has also recently admitted to overcharging the De-
partment of Veterans Affairs (VA) for vaccines.42 Initially, the company notified 
the VA that it had made a mistake calculating the price of the vaccines between 
2007 and 2011, exceeding the federal ceiling price for drugs,43 but a VA investi-
gation concluded that Sanofi had overcharged it for a period of nine years, be-
ginning in 2002. In April 2017, the Department of Justice announced that it had 
reached a settlement with Sanofi in the amount of $19.8 million.44 
Within a few weeks of the settlement, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) announced a temporary (but total) depletion of Sanofi’s YF-
VAX, the only FDA-approved yellow-fever vaccine in the United States.45 The 
shortage has been attributed to a “manufacturing complication” that occurred 
 
40. 35 U.S.C. § 209(a)(2) (2012). 
41. See, e.g., Bernie Sanders, Bernie Sanders: Trump Should Avoid a Bad Zika Deal, N.Y.  
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2017) http://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/opinion/bernie-sanders 
-trump-should-avoid-a-bad-zika-deal.html [http://perma.cc/N96S-ZNAX]. 
42. Joel Schectman & Susan Heavey, Sanofi to Pay $19.8 Mln Over Claims of Drug Overcharges—
U.S., REUTERS (Apr. 3, 2017, 4:24 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/sanofi-usa 
-idUSL2N1HB1PP [http://perma.cc/C2RJ-FXHQ]. 
43. Veterans Health Care Act of 1992 § 603, 38 U.S.C. § 8126 (2012). 
44. Sanofi Pasteur Agrees to Pay $19.8 Million to Resolve Drug Overcharges to the Department of Vet-
erans Affairs, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 3, 2017), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/Sanofi 
-pasteur-agrees-pay-198-million-resolve-drug-overcharges-department-veterans-affairs 
[http://perma.cc/R7QD-S8JE]. 
45. Announcement: Temporary Total Depletion of US Licensed Yellow Fever Vaccine Addressed by 
Availability of Stamaril Vaccine at Selected Clinics, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 
(Apr. 18, 2017), http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/news-announcements/yellow-fever-vaccine 
-access [http://perma.cc/ERN6-Y7EG]. 
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while Sanofi transferred inventory to a new manufacturing facility.46 Every 
year, 500,000 doses of Sanofi’s vaccine are distributed to 4,000 civilian clinics, 
where they are administered to people traveling to areas where yellow fever is 
endemic, as well as to other sites where they are administered to members of 
the U.S. military who are exposed to this life-threatening disease.47 To meet the 
demand for the vaccine in the United States, Sanofi has now begun importing a 
different vaccine, Stamaril, administered routinely in Europe and elsewhere, 
but currently unapproved for use in the United States.48 
While the CDC and FDA have backed this temporary strategy for ensuring 
the availability of a yellow fever vaccine in the United States,49 the ongoing 
shortage points to broader concerns raised by sole-source manufacturing of 
drugs. In addition to pricing issues, exclusive exploitation of a vaccine may lead 
to a situation of market failure, in which a life-saving drug becomes unavailable 
to would-be consumers. This is especially problematic in the case of diseases 
like Zika, for which alternative drugs do not exist. 
Sanofi’s announcement in September 2017 that it would pause the devel-
opment of the Army’s Zika vaccine leaves several questions unaddressed, at 
least in the short term.50 Furthermore, the evidence suggests that the choice of 
an exclusive license was poorly justified by the Army, and potentially flawed in 
its substantive parameters. 
It should be noted, however, that Sanofi’s decision to stop R&D on Zika is 
directly linked to the loss of BARDA’s financial support, and BARDA has made 
it clear that it may resume funding Zika vaccine R&D if a new outbreak oc-
curs.51 These problems are therefore likely to resurface in the medium and long 
runs, and perhaps even sooner than expected.52 
More generally, these issues are not specific to Zika vaccine development—
all types of biomedical innovation, if covered by patents owned by the federal 
 
46. Mark D. Gershman et al., Addressing a Yellow Fever Vaccine Shortage—United States, 2016-
2017, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (May 5, 2017), http://www.cdc.gov
/mmwr/volumes/66/wr/mm6617e2.htm [http://perma.cc/MAC8-SAWM]. 
47. Id. 
48. Yellow Fever Vaccine Access, SANOFI PASTEUR (last updated Nov. 1, 2017), http://www
.sanofipasteur.us/vaccines/yellowfevervaccine [http://perma.cc/D6W7-XVVG]. 
49. Id. 
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government, fall under the purview of § 207 and § 209.53 The next Part consid-
ers possible solutions to the policy problems posed by the current regime. 
i i .  l icensure in the public interest: the case for targeted 
changes to the patent act 
A. Changing the Licensing Culture To Ensure Affordability of Vaccines 
The attempted licensure of the Army’s Zika vaccine in terms that potentially 
violate the normative framework for the transfer of government-developed 
technology has attracted considerable criticism from different domains.54 In the 
heat of the debate, several institutions called for changes to the Army’s Zika li-
cense, particularly with a view to making the vaccine available at affordable 
prices.55 These proposed changes may be useful in informing future licensing 
negotiations between the government and the private sector. 
The most comprehensive proposal focusing on pricing resulted from a joint 
effort by Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders (MSF) and 
Knowledge Ecology International (KEI). This proposal distinguishes between 
two markets for the Zika vaccine: the United States and developing nations 
abroad. In the case of the latter, MSF and KEI suggested that the Army should 
require that Sanofi . . . disclose the steps it will take to enable the regis-
tration and availability of the vaccine at an affordable price in every 
country with a demonstrated need, according to the CDC/WHO, either 
 
53. All publicly funded technologies, including vaccines, are also subject to march-in rights, 
which allow the government to require a licensee to sub-license the technology if the licen-
see fails to develop the technology, or to meet health and safety needs. See § 203(a)(1) 
and§ 203(a)(2). While this regime falls outside the scope of this Essay, it should be noted 
that the government has never exercised march-in rights, even when under public pressure 
to do so. See Ryan Whalen, The Bayh–Dole Act & Public Rights in Federally Funded Inventions: 
Will The Agencies Ever Go Marching In?, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 1083 (2015). 
54. See, e.g., Alison Kodjak, States Fear Price if New Zika Vaccine Will Be More Than They Can 
Pay, NPR (May 30, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/05/30
/529887446/states-fear-price-of-new-zika-vaccine-will-be-more-than-they-can-pay [http://
perma.cc/6H6X-8GR8]; Ed Silverman, Lawmakers Ask U.S. Army to Hold a Hearing on Zika 
Vaccine Licensing, STAT (June 14, 2017), http://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2017/06/14
/lawmakers-army-zika-vaccine [http://perma.cc/5HMH-3584]. 
55. See US Department of Defense Announces Decision to Give Pharmaceutical Corporation Exclusive 
Rights on Taxpayer-Funded Zika Vaccine, Failing to Ensure Affordable and Sustainable Access, 
MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES (Apr. 25, 2017), http://www.msfaccess.org/about-us/media 
-room/press-releases/us-department-defense-announces-decision-give-pharmaceutical 
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by supplying a country directly at an affordable, publicly disclosed price 
and with sufficient quantities, or by providing technology transfer and 
rights to all intellectual property necessary for third parties to do so.56 
MSF/KEI then addressed the different configuration of the U.S. market, 
where taxpayer dollars have already offset part of the cost associated with the 
R&D undertaken by Sanofi. The proposal provides a formula for calculating an 
affordable price for the vaccine: 
Sanofi agrees to make the vaccine available to the public in the U.S. at 
publicly disclosed prices no higher than the median price charged in the 
seven countries with the largest GDP, which have per capita incomes of 
at least half that of the U.S.57 
Under this approach, Sanofi would presumably be able to charge more for 
the vaccine in the United States than in smaller economies, but the mandatory 
price cap would prevent the company from asking for exorbitant amounts, en-
suring that the vaccine is available to most consumers in the United States. 
Both prongs of the MSF/KEI proposal mitigate the problems created by the 
grant of an exclusive license in a system that does little to promote ex ante ne-
gotiation of licensing terms that maximize the public interest. They are suitable 
ad hoc fixes when the ideal solution—a nonexclusive license—is no longer on 
the table. Considering the Army’s self-professed lack of expertise to engage in 
pricing negotiations, the proposal puts forth two straightforward solutions that 
the Army may easily adopt if BARDA resumes funding of Zika R&D, rekin-
dling Sanofi’s interest in the exclusive license. More broadly, the proposal may 
also help guide future license negotiations by agencies that transfer federally 
funded vaccine technology to the private sector. 
However, there remains a need for changes to the current regime as a 
whole, in ways that truly further the public interest. This is especially true 
when transfers of technology involve vaccines. With unpredictable outbreaks 
looming on the horizon,58 vaccines play a crucial role both in preventing them 
 
56. KEI and Médecins Sans Frontières Propose Contractual Terms to Protect Access and Affordability of 
Zika Vaccine, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (July 25, 2017), http://www.keionline.org/node
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57. Letter from James Love, Dir., Knowledge Ecology Int’l, et al., to Barry M. Datlof, Command 
Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Med. Research and Material Command (July 24, 2017), http://
www.keionline.org/wp-content/uploads/KEI-MSF-Army-Zika-Vaccine-Proposed-Text 
-Pricing.pdf [http://perma.cc/U6M3-L5JV]. 
58. See Bryan Walsh, The World Is Not Ready for the Next Pandemic, TIME (May 4, 2017), 
http://time.com/4766624/next-global-security [http://perma.cc/35SN-RJEC]. 
vaccine licensure in the public interest: lessons from the 
development of the u.s. army zika vaccine 
663 
and in mitigating their impact on health systems across the world.59 Making 
sure that vaccine technology is transferred efficiently and fairly is imperative. 
B. Proposed Changes to the Patent Act 
Two improvements to the Patent Act’s regulation of transfers of govern-
ment-owned technology can help ensure fair and efficient access to vaccines. 
First, we should reform the notice requirement regime as a whole. And second, 
in order to avoid the specific drawbacks of exclusive licenses on vaccines for 
traditionally underfunded diseases, we should consider prohibiting exclusivity 
in certain circumstances. 
A troubling lack of transparency characterizes the current notice require-
ment regime. Currently, § 209(e) establishes that federal agencies must give 
public notice of the intention to grant an exclusive license of an invention de-
veloped by the federal government. The notice must be given “in an appropri-
ate manner” and at least fi�een days before the license is granted. Additionally, 
agencies must provide a comment period and “consider all comments” received 
during that window of time. But § 209 does not require agencies to make pub-
lic any substantive terms of negotiated licenses. The opaque process of trans-
ferring federally funded technology leaves commentators and the public in the 
dark about the reach of the license. 
This problem stretches beyond the lack of transparency of the negotiation 
process. As seen above, § 209 also requires agencies to make a finding that “the 
public will be served” by the license and that the “scope of exclusivity is not 
greater than reasonably necessary.”60 But it is impossible to have truly informed 
commentary on either of these points if no substantive information is provid-
ed. For the same reasons, opacity makes it harder for the agency to be held ac-
countable for its exclusivity assessment (or lack thereof). 
Consider the notice given for the Army’s Zika vaccine: it has now been 
made clear that the Army does not negotiate affordable pricing provisions 
when transferring vaccine technology. Yet it should, as the main concern with 
exclusivity is that it will allow a company to charge more than is necessary for a 
drug. Simply put, failing to consider whether a vaccine will be available at 
affordable prices is licensing against the public interest. 
In situations like this, the opacity of notice requirements may thus foster li-
censing practices contrary to § 209 that nonetheless are shielded from public 
 
59. See John-Arne Røttingen et al., New Vaccines against Epidemic Infectious Diseases, 376 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 610, 610-611 (Feb. 16, 2017). 
60. 35 U.S.C. § 209(a)(2) (2012). 
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scrutiny for extended periods of time. To encourage public commentary—and 
to promote a licensing culture of greater accountability—we should therefore 
amend § 209(e) to include a core of substantive information that agencies must 
disclose when transferring federally funded inventions. Among the information 
that should be mandatorily provided, disclosure of pricing provisions (or lack 
thereof) is especially relevant. At a time when the cost of drugs and biophar-
maceuticals attracts more public scrutiny than ever before, such a requirement 
would potentially nudge agencies to negotiate affordable prices (or standards 
for calculating affordable prices)61 before transferring vaccines and other health 
technologies out of the public sector. At the very least, in cases of agencies that 
maintain a practice of not negotiating pricing provisions, the mandatory dis-
closure of the inexistence of such provisions would have the advantage of ena-
bling immediate public debate about the ultimate affordability of publicly 
funded technology. In addition to pricing issues, there are other types of provi-
sions that should be disclosed by agencies when technology is transferred out 
of the public sector. In the context of exclusive licensing, for example, disclos-
ing the term of the license is helpful to assess whether the measure of exclusivi-
ty is adequate to overturn the Patent Act’s general preference for nonexclusive 
licenses.62 An alternative or concomitant step to creating a list of core infor-
mation to be disclosed by agencies is to require them to provide a justification 
for exclusivity, including an explanation of how the license serves the public 
and why the scope of exclusivity is appropriate. 
While such an amendment would be applicable to all types of technologies 
subject to § 209 transfers, there are certain technologies for which exclusive li-
censes might be especially problematic. This is the case of vaccines targeting 
diseases like Zika. From an R&D perspective, “mainstream diseases” command 
a great deal of funding, while others are outright unattractive due to expected 
low return (or no return) on investment. Zika funding plummeted throughout 
2017,63 even a�er all the attention brought by the 2015-2016 outbreak. The im-
mediate interruption of R&D on the Army’s Zika vaccine following BARDA’s 
withdrawal of funding illustrates the pitfalls of trusting the development of the 
vaccine to a single entity. A possible lesson from the Zika case study is that 
there are some diseases for which the grant of exclusive licenses should not be 
allowed. The Patent Act already explicitly favors nonexclusive licenses,64 as in-
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dicated above. And there have been instances in which federal agencies have 
granted nonexclusive licenses on vaccine technology: for example, in 2005 the 
National Institutes of Health granted eight nonexclusive licenses on rotavirus 
vaccines.65 
For diseases like Zika, it is therefore likely that the public interest is fur-
thered if exclusivity is not allowed. However, a prohibition on exclusivity 
should be narrowly construed. Prime candidates for this list would be diseases 
that are not endemic to the United States, like Zika. In addition to ad hoc 
choices, the WHO and the CDC have lists of so-called “neglected tropical dis-
eases,” which could be used as a basis for identifying diseases that should be 
encompassed by a prohibition on exclusivity.66 
conclusion 
The transfer of federally funded vaccine technology presents unique chal-
lenges in reconciling the need for private-sector R&D with the furtherance of 
the public interest when the resulting invention is brought to the market. As 
illustrated by the recent case of the Army-developed Zika vaccine, federal agen-
cies o�en favor the granting of exclusive licenses, despite the Patent Act’s ex-
plicit preference for nonexclusivity. While the granting of exclusive licenses is 
not per se against the public interest, in practice several problems are likely to 
occur, from lack of competition and overpricing to concerns surrounding sin-
gle-source manufacturing. This scenario is especially problematic in the context 
of vaccines for underfunded diseases. Two fixes could help mitigate these prob-
lems: first, notices of intent to license should contain a disclosure of core of 
substantive provisions, including pricing provisions; and second, the transfer 
of certain technologies should be treated in a more stringent way—specifically, 
the Patent Act should be amended to forbid exclusive licensing of vaccines for 
underfunded diseases. 
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